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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


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MILITARY EDUCATION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: Conflict Analysis Resolution Theories For Professional Military Education

Author: Major John K. Kelley, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: There is a gap between the military's version of conflict analysis and the civilian version of conflict analysis and resolution. It is important to bridge this gap because doing so will save lives by shortening or preventing violent conflict. This knowledge gap can only be overcome by integrating many of the conflict analysis and resolution theories from the civilian academic community into military training and education.

Discussion: This paper focuses on the United States Military's role in conflict termination, conflict resolution, and stability operations. The central question is: how can civilian conflict analysis and resolution theories improve military effectiveness? This is a relevant question because there are some fundamental differences between conflict resolution in the academic sphere and the military sphere. It is taken for granted, for the purposes of this paper, that conflict resolution is emerging as a requirement for military planners and operators. Thus, this paper develops from the premise that planners and operators must know something about conflict resolution if they are to perform their missions in the future. To this end, this paper begins by exploring relevant terms and concepts related to conflict resolution and the military. The paper then moves to explore some of the most relevant theories that relate conflict analysis and resolution to the military. Of these theories, only one, Ted Gurr's "relative deprivation theory," is mentioned in military doctrine. Relative deprivation is mentioned in the Counterinsurgency annotated bibliography but is not explained. The other theories are not found in military doctrine and are not taught at professional military education schools. These theories include, John Burton's "needs theory," Johan Galtung's "cultural violence," Marie Dugan's "nested theory of conflict," and John Paul Lederach's "integrated framework for peace building." Finally, the mediation/facilitation/reflection practice called "appreciative inquiry," will be presented as an alternative perspective that is juxtaposed to the present problem-solving construct. The paper ends with a section on ways to integrate the above-mentioned theories into professional military education.

Conclusion: This study began by exploring recent changes in military doctrine concerning the military's role in fulfilling its charge to support strategic goals. There is a new emphasis on reconstruction and stability operations. The research found that planning for and conducting these types of operations require a different focus for military forces and coercive force might not always be the best answer for the conflict. The research demonstrates that there are alternative theories and models for dealing with conflict. The insight this provides the military community is that there are many tools that can be used to decipher complicated social conflicts.

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PREFACE

This research project and paper writing has been a very personal journey for me because it required me to reflect on my participation in Desert Shield/Storm, Kosovo, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and all the other military deployments I have made during my career. The short version of what I discovered is that there were serious disconnects between what I had been told to expect and what I actually experienced. It also required me to reflect on my own problem solving process. This was at times a frightening experience as I attempted to figure out how I solved tactical problems in the field and interpersonal problems presented to me by those I was leading. Honest reflection told me that I made mistakes and I was not as well prepared as I should have been. That being said, I was not sure where or how to make the required improvements. In the back of my mind there has always been a nagging notion that violence does not really solve problems and coercion is not conducive to bringing about peace. Additional reflection brought me to the realization that peace is generally the desired end-state for most actions, but my professional military education was exclusively focused on war. Almost every book on my bookshelf had the word war in the title and none had the word peace. Researching peace brought me to the conflict analysis and resolution field. This report is my first attempt to bridge the gap between a group of professionals that believe war is never the answer and a group of professionals who think that war, or at least violence is a viable answer to a problem. A great deal of work remains to be done but if this paper at least starts the dialogue then it has served its purpose.

I would like to thank Professor Rebecca Johnson for helping me focus my efforts while I struggled to make the link between theory and practice. I also thank the other professors and military members of the faculty at the Command and Staff College for supporting me as I

struggled to tie concepts together and improve my critical thinking. I also thank the faculty at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University because many of them were instrumental in guiding my journey toward understanding. Finally, I have to thank my wife because without her help I do not think I would have been able to make this journey.

Introduction

This paper focuses on the United States Military's role in conflict termination, conflict resolution, and stability operations. The central question is: how can civilian conflict analysis and resolution theories improve military effectiveness? This is a relevant question because there are some fundamental differences between conflict resolution in the academic sphere and the military sphere. Perhaps the most difficult difference to overcome is the general belief within the conflict resolution community and the peace studies community that violence cannot bring resolution to a conflict. Seen from this perspective, it is difficult to imagine the military bringing about resolution because violence and coercion or the threats thereof are generally the military's preferred techniques. That being said, it is often the military that will lay the foundation for other elements of national power in countries when the level of violence prohibits other agencies from operating. It is important that the foundation the military begins to build will support resolving the conflict. It is difficult for the military to be an honest broker or mediator to a conflict because the military maintains a powerful position backed by violence. That being said, it is essential that military members understand the tactics and techniques used to during operations have direct impact on how and if a conflict can be resolved.

The paper explores theories and models of conflict analysis and resolution that could be incorporated in the professional military education system and possibly written into doctrine. This is an important step because the military's track record for lasting peace after conflict termination needs improvement. Somalia, Iraq after Desert Storm, Nicaragua, Haiti, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea, Vietnam, and most of the U.N. sponsored peace operations all offer testament to the need for more than conflict termination based on the terms established by the U.S. military. These conflicts did not end with the cessation of violence and very little was

done to transform or resolve the underlying conflict. Coercion, violence, and the threat of additional violence stopped the killing but it did not solve the problem because there was little social transformation toward peace. This paper argues that there is a knowledge gap between the military's version of conflict analysis and the civilian version of conflict analysis and resolution. This knowledge gap can only be overcome by integrating many of the conflict resolution theories from the civilian academic community into military training and education. It is important to note that generally speaking the academic and civilian view of conflict resolution is that only peaceful means should be used when dealing with conflict. It is controversial for civilian conflict resolution professionals to work with the military in much the same way it is controversial for anthropologists to work with the military. That being said, it is crucial to integrate civilian academic theories into military training and education to bridge the gap in education.

Bridging this gap will give military members more of the skills needed to be better capable of bringing about a more meaningful and lasting peace to conflicts. Planners and operators may even become able to resolve conflicts around the globe before they manifest themselves into physical violence and thus transform the world. In the conflict resolution domain this is called transformation. In the military domain it is generally seen as Phase 0 operations that are conducted to prevent conflict. Resolution is the best means for preventing violent conflict.

This paper will not spend a great deal of time exploring the recent military doctrine developments concerning conflict resolution, conflict termination, and the problem solving approach the military uses. It is sufficient for this paper to note that the recent elevation of

stability operations to be on par with offensive and defensive type operations was a large step toward institutionalizing the complex requirements of conflict resolution.¹

Stability operations require the military to better integrate other elements of national power and civilian organizations. Maintaining or creating stability is now a primary mission but the path to stability is generally not solely through the military. The recently published Counterinsurgency Field Manual is also a good example of progressive thinking that looks to expand the solution sets for complex problems.² Additionally, the recently released draft version of the Marine Corps planning process includes an expanded problem-framing step that requires planners to take a more holistic approach to analyzing the problem.³ In other words, before planners even decide what the mission is they must carefully define the problem or conflict within the larger context. This is relevant because expanding the analytical problem solving scope to include issues that might have been previously considered outside the military planner's scope means that planners must change their own frame of reference. Planners must dig into what lies beneath the overt conflict to find deeper causes. Problem framing is a step in the right direction with respect to analyzing a problem but any the analysis should be based on conflict theories. Expanding the military planners' horizons should lead to more comprehensive operations that are balanced and complete.

It is taken for granted, for the purposes of this paper, that conflict resolution is emerging as a requirement for military planners and operators. Thus, this paper develops from the premise that planners and operators must know something about conflict resolution if they are to perform their missions in the future. To this end, this paper will begin by exploring relevant terms and concepts related to conflict resolution and the military. The paper will then move to explore some of the most relevant theories that relate conflict analysis and resolution to the military. Of

these theories, only one, Ted Gurr's "relative deprivation theory," is mentioned in military doctrine. Relative deprivation is mentioned in the Counterinsurgency annotated bibliography but is not explained. The other theories are not found in military doctrine and are not taught at professional military education schools. These theories include, John Burton's "needs theory," Johan Galtung's "cultural violence," Marie Dugan's "nested theory of conflict," and John Paul Lederach's "integrated framework for peace building." Finally, the mediation/facilitation/reflection practice called "appreciative inquiry," will be presented as an alternative perspective that is juxtaposed to the present problem-solving construct. In other words, appreciative inquiry is a completely different way to look at a situation and bring about desired change. The paper will end with recommendations for the way ahead, a road map for introducing conflict resolution into professional military education if you will.

The first step along the path toward this end-state is to define terms and explore how these terms are relevant to the military.

Section I: Definitions

The conflict resolution community and the military have different definitions for key concepts, which merit clarification. There are many definitions of conflict but this author agrees with Warfield and Nan's definition. *Conflict* is defined as "a struggle between two or more interdependent people or groups who perceive they have incompatible goals and scarce resources and where opposing parties are actively interfering with each other's attempts to achieve those goals."⁴ Using this definition then, *violent conflict* is simply when the struggle becomes physical. Likewise, *structural conflict* or *structural violence* is conflict or violence intrinsic to the systems and structures in place. The officially sanctioned slavery of the early United States is an extreme example of structural violence. Another example of structural violence is the

United States' refusal to allow women to serve in ground combat military occupational specialties. The structure itself does not allow for women to fully participate in all activities, which in essence oppresses the group. In this case it is the larger societal bias that causes discrimination against women. The military structure reflects social norms that discriminate against women. The point is that the established structure itself oppresses one group and that is a form of violence.

Resolution means to convert, transfer, or alter something into a different form, which in the context of conflict resolution has the meaning of altering a conflict toward a peaceful end. Peacefully resolving a conflict means addressing parties' perceived incompatible goals without using violence. Sometimes this requires changing behaviors, sometimes it requires changing social beliefs and relationships, and sometimes it requires changing larger structures that make up society at large. Conflict resolution focuses on addressing incompatible goals and conflict transformation focuses on reshaping social structures to better support peace. The definition of *transformation* that applies to this discussion is simply the act of changing any social structure toward a more peaceful situation. So, conflict transformation has a strong connotation that the conflict itself and the parties to the conflict must change to be more peaceful. Conflict resolution does not have this same connotation because it simply means that the reasons for the conflict are no longer causing disagreement. Both terms have connotations of change in an effort to remove the conflict but conflict transformation has a deeper more fundamental meaning to it.

One final note on definitions: one can terminate, or end, a military intervention but that does not necessarily terminate a conflict. Conflict is natural and can be a positive force for change; however, when conflict becomes violent there is very little chance for meaningful progress toward resolution. It is an important distinction that conflict termination in the military

sense is not the same thing as conflict resolution. Generally speaking, conflict termination simply means the cessation of hostilities, while conflict resolution means that there has been a positive change within and between societies. This means that not only has the violence stopped, but there have also been fundamental changes among and between the parties to the conflict that will prevent future violent conflicts. With this in mind we now turn to the conflict resolution theorists.

Section II: Conflict analysis and resolution theories

Conflict analysis and resolution theories from the civilian academic fields are necessary for military members because they allow the military to better frame problems and generate long term and lasting solutions. It is important for the military to expand its understanding of conflict analysis and conflict resolution because failures in the current world have the potential to spiral out of control and could prove very costly in material and lives. Put another way, misunderstanding the conflict can lead to solutions that actually make the problem worse. We have already seen that the military has been charged with playing a more proactive and positive role in stability operations and the military is required to further national strategic interests around the world. Sometimes national strategic interests call for transforming societies and resolving conflicts.

These theories and models are not a panacea or formula to solve all the world's problems but they can be helpful for commanders and staff. These theories can and will serve as a potential bridge between the military, the governmental organizations, the non-governmental organizations, and the civilian populations. This does not simply give the military planner a few more tools for the planning kit-bag; it gives the military planner a new vocabulary and new ideas about how to see the world so that small conflicts do not become protracted violent conflicts and

protracted violent conflicts can be transformed into sustainable peace. Sometimes a small shift in perspective is enough to see a solution clearly.

Ted Gurr's Relative Deprivation Theory

Ted Gurr's relative deprivation (RD) theory is of particular significance for military officers because it offers fairly concrete methods to evaluate the intensity of frustration. The theory does not claim that all deprivation will lead to violence but it does offer a plausible explanation for why humans might resort to violence. According to Gurr, "RD is a discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities."⁵ Value expectations relate to personal wealth, status, or other measures of self worth. An example of value expectation is that a person might expect to maintain a standard of living at least as high as his/her parents. This expectation is extremely strong and when it is not met the person will be frustrated. It is this frustration that has the potential to lead to conflict. Value capabilities are related to expectations in the sense that capabilities represent what is actually achievable. Of course what is expected is not always what is achievable. The relation between these two factors is central to the theory. It must be noted that one of the strengths of this theory is that expectations and capabilities within a society are measurable through quantifiable survey or other information gathering methods. In other words, one can measure and track potential conflict by asking the people involved in the conflict what they think. Those segments of a society that are increasingly frustrated warrant intervention at the appropriate level.

In the event that value expectations are constant but capabilities diminish there will be frustration. Gurr calls this situation 'Decremental Deprivation'.⁶ This situation is difficult for military planners because often times the diminishing capabilities are due to external or even global circumstances that are difficult to influence but understanding the basis for the problem

can help identify those factors that can be influenced. Agrarian societies or communities depending on fair market prices for their goods might fall victim to globalization and dropping market prices as their commodity is produced cheaper somewhere else in the world. This is particularly problematic if the community has but one crop or industry. An example of this is poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for the opium trade. The expectation is that a farmer will be able to provide a certain standard of living for his family. Interrupting poppy cultivation will cause a decline in the farmer's ability to provide this standard of living. Understanding that this will become a problem prior to conducting military operations in Afghanistan and making a plan to prevent it from happening will make the military much more effective and efficient.

'Aspirational Deprivation' occurs when values expectations rise – perhaps as a result of the interconnectedness of the Internet and international social networks – but value capabilities remain constant.⁷ This situation is most often seen during peace operations or when one invading power proclaims itself to be a liberator but is unable to produce meaningful progress in a short period of time. Again, this situation is made all the more difficult with modern technology and the powerful forces of globalization. The United States initial operations in Iraq provide a good example of this problem. The US military proclaimed to be liberators of Iraq and promised a better life for the Iraqi people. The liberation rhetoric raised the Iraqis' expectations about the future. Unfortunately, when these aspirations were not met with meaningful progress due to a deteriorating security situation there was widespread frustration that led to violence. This situation could have been avoided to some extent if the US planners understood that raising expectations too high too fast without making meaningful progress would lead to frustration. The messages would have been different and thus aspirations would not have risen as much.

Gurr's third scenario, 'Progressive Deprivation', has value expectations and capabilities rising together but at some point in time value capabilities fall off, causing frustration and possibly leading to violence.⁸ The bottom falling out of the housing market in the U.S. is a good example of this phenomenon. If not for the social safety networks and well-established legal structures in the U.S., it is quite possible that more violence could have occurred.

When frustration levels reach a certain point it is logical and completely human to lash out against the perceived perpetrator. Frustration and anger are natural human emotions that if left unaddressed will lead to violence. Unfortunately this violence is often misdirected against other communities or groups in close proximity to the frustrated group even if there is no relation between that group and the cause of the frustration. An example of this behavior can be seen when rioters burn and pillage their own neighborhoods.

Gurr's theory is relevant for the military because it helps one understand measurable situations that might lead to frustration and eventually violence. This is more than simply learning to manage expectations or using logical lines of operation to make living conditions better within a country. An example of how this theory might benefit military members is to look at the most recent conflict in Iraq. One of the main themes the invading coalition forces used was liberation and bringing democracy to the people. In other words, the theme was that the coalition forces were fighting to make things better in Iraq. The coalition messages played on civilian expectations but as the security situation worsened the forces were not able to provide an increase in capability. The reality of the situation was that the message caused cognitive dissonance among the civilian population, or at least it appears that way. It might have been more productive if the military chose different messages or realized that such inspirational

messages would have to be followed with a concerted effort to increase the average person's capabilities.

The point is that relative deprivation theory would have given the military planners another perspective on the problem and that could have led to techniques and procedures that limited civilian frustrations and possibly averted some of the violence. This requires translating the diagnostic portion of the theory into useful action. In the above-mentioned case of Iraq this might have meant more detailed plans to manage expectations or possibly a more concerted effort to at least maintain the general population's production capabilities by protecting infrastructure and factories.

John Burton's *Needs Theory*.

Needs theory at first glance might look something akin to Maslow's hierarchy of needs but all similarity ends after the first glance. For Burton there is no hierarchy to the needs and the needs described are universal. There is some minor debate over how to articulate these needs but general consensus is that the three basic needs are recognition, identity, and psychological security. "The distinctive feature of 'needs' . . . is that they are assumed to be inherent in human beings and in other species also and, therefore, universal and not just cultural."⁹ The fact that they are universal means that every single human, past, present, and future, has these needs or will have these needs. Universal needs also means that one cannot cede these needs to a higher authority because to do so would to deny being human. In his own words, "there are certain ontological human needs that will be pursued" and they "provide a power greater than police and military power."¹⁰

This theory is relevant for the military because it helps to explain what might trigger innate behaviors in any human given certain circumstances. It is not a forgone conclusion that

oppressing someone's identity or failing to recognize their right will lead to direct violence but it is assured that failure to take these needs into account will cause conflict. It is helpful to know that all humans require some form of recognition because planners and analysts can then work to understand how a unique adversary satisfies this requirement. Returning to the Iraq example, it would have been beneficial to realize ahead of time how powerful family honor and the shame culture was before the invasion.

Burton also writes, "the issue of concern is whether such needs can be suppressed and whether, therefore, citizens can become subject to control by authorities, or whether needs remain a power unto themselves, not subject to control by the individual, placing the individual outside the control of authorities."¹¹ This is a legitimate concern for military planners because one of the primary missions the military performs outside of combat is rule of law enforcement or control of peoples. It might help leaders to understand that it is impossible to control people if these basic human needs are not met.

Johan Galtung's *Cultural Violence Theory*




Figure 1. Adapted from Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. 2nd edition. (Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 10.

While Johan Galtung is known to have antipathy toward the coercive capacity of the military, his theories of conflict analysis and resolution provide useful insight. Galtung is best known for articulating "a causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence can be identified."¹² This violence relationship is better described as a triangle labeled violence with

direct – structural – cultural relationship at the three points. In his theory, violence creates more violence and cultures of violence are not models of virtue. He defines cultural violence as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence.”¹³ He continues with the observation that “cultural violence makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not wrong.”¹⁴ This is relevant to the military because when looking to create stability it is possible to dismiss host nation forces use of violence as part of their culture and thus justified. There is the potential for perpetuating violence in the name of culture and that is dangerous. It is beneficial for military leaders to continually assess the legitimacy of violence and choose the appropriate methods for the appropriate situations. An example of structural violence in pre-invasion Iraq was the Baath party. The laws and governmental structures benefitted party members at the cost of the population. The government was oppressive and exploited the people and the structures perpetuated the situation.

Galtung cautions against oppressive leaders when he observes that oppressive leaders, “prefer ‘governability’ to ‘trouble, anarchy’. They love ‘stability’. Indeed, a major form of cultural violence indulged in by ruling elites is to blame the victim of structural violence who throws the first stone, not in a glasshouse but to get out of the iron cage, stamping him as ‘aggressor’.”¹⁵ In the case of the oppressed throwing off the ropes of oppression, what is a U.S. military member to do when he/she is called in to quell the rebellion of the down trodden and oppressed? Galtung will cause the military officer to think through these difficult questions. This can be a troubling proposition for the military because it is possible that the political goals that are dictating strategy are not in consonance with what is happening at the tactical level. An

example of this might be that the U.S. government supports a central government but that government is corrupt and the people in the villages know it is corrupt so there are concerns about every one's motives. Galtung would most likely tell that military members that unless they solve the larger structural problem then any progress made at the tactical level will be useless. This might seem like common sense but there are numerous examples of this type of situation arising from both military decisions and political decisions. Galtung's writing should serve as a guide for those fighting for peace.

Galtung uses two additional triangles for explaining his models. One is the model of conflict and the other is the model of peace. Just as with the model for violence, there is a tension between the different corners of the triangle. The model for conflict has *contradiction – attitude – behavior* at the corners. The contradiction represents the root issue or the underlying issue. The attitude represents the “the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves.”¹⁶ This is well understood in the military as perceptions of the ‘other’ or the enemy are manipulated and often dehumanized. This is helpful for high-intensity combat but it proves counter-productive as military interventions continue past Phase III operations because the “enemy” must be protected and brought back into society. The third component is behavior and can “include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility.”¹⁷ Behavior is the most easily identifiable aspect of the conflict triangle and it also the most easily modified.

According to Galtung, conflicts ebb and flow as the tension between the three components changes and as one aspect gains more weight. If these tensions are not dealt with, over time a conflict can begin to enlarge and as the conflict enlarges the chances for peaceful intervention decreases. The larger the conflict, and the closer it comes to violence, the more

constricted participants in the conflict become. There are many different reasons for this but the best way to think about it is that there are certain points of no return and as stated earlier, Galtung believes that violence begets violence and that is a difficult cycle to break.¹⁸ With respect to the triangle, all three must be present to some extent and as attitudes and behavior slide down the slippery slope toward direct violence the whole thing can enlarge.

Galtung's third model is the peace triangle. The three corners of the triangle are *peace building – peace making – peacekeeping*.¹⁹ These three approaches to peace are interrelated and dependent on each other and are in tension with each other. The strategic goal is positive peace. "Galtung defined 'negative peace' as the cessation of direct violence and 'positive peace' as the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well."²⁰ This model is helpful for the military because it shows that the military has a role to play in all three elements, not just as peacekeepers. It is important to understand that when called upon to be a part of a peacekeeping operation, thus becoming part of the conflict, there will be elements of peace building and peace making required.

The military planner or commander can use these models to help predict what might lead to violence or what might lead away from violence. The triangle model fits well with the military model of dealing with the people – military – government. In this model it is clear that actions taken to influence one leg of the triangle will have influence on the other two legs. It is a very simple visual depiction of complex interrelations that will help frame a conflict and the roles people have within that conflict.

Máire Dugan's *Nested Theory of Conflict*

Dugan's nested theory of conflict explores the connection between issues and the larger system where those issues take place. This is analogous to looking at problems within the level of

war. An issue at the tactical level might not really be an issue at the operational or strategic level, but if there is an issue at the operational or strategic level there will be an issue at the tactical level. Sometimes the tactical issue can be traced from the tactical to the strategic.

Dugan describes the lowest level her model as, “Issues-specific conflicts are analytically the simplest and most frequent types of conflict (which does not mean that they are always easy to resolve, nor even that they are always solvable) and can occur between or among individuals or groups of any size.”²¹ Quite often this is the realm the military is most comfortable dealing with. At this level there are generally tangible reasons or readily identifiable reasons for the conflict. Dealing with issues at this level might require external mediation but very often these situations simply require the intervener to call upon the established justice structures within a society. These issues also fit nicely into the military’s problem solving mindset because there is a problem that is identifiable and analyzable. That being said, sometimes the issue is not all there is to a conflict.

“Sometimes, however, the issues themselves are not the real source of the conflict. A relational conflict is one which emerges from problems having to do with interaction patterns or the parties and their feelings toward each other.”²² This level is slightly more difficult to deal with because language, emotions, prejudices, and social structures play a much bigger part in the conflict. In its simplest form it might be that two belligerents refuse to talk to each other because real or perceived animosity. Sometimes this is manifested in nation states and sometimes it happens between individuals. Extreme relational problems are not difficult to identify but subtle relationship conflicts might escape the notice of even the most dedicated resolution professional no matter how insidious the problem might be. Sometimes cultural indoctrination can help catch nuanced relationship problems but that is not a guarantee.

The next level of conflict is the sub-system level, which places the relational issues in context within a larger system. “Sub-system level conflicts often mirror conflicts on the broader system.”²³ It is important to note that sometimes the system is not really at fault but sub-system conflicts might have a life all their own. “System-level structural conflict emerges from inequalities that are built into the social system.”²⁴ This might be overt institutionalized or structural violence against a segment of society like the Kurds in Iraq under the Hussein regime. The strength of the model is that it offers a framework for the military commander or his staff to step back and possibly link issues with larger structural problems within a society before an intervention or operation. Once these links are identified it is easier to create a vision for the future that will make all the smaller issues irrelevant. Another way to look at the model is to see that fixing all the issues-specific conflict that manifest themselves within a society will not bring about progress in the strategic arena if the fundamental or systemic problems are not dealt with. This is another way to look at a situation so that one does not again win every battle but lose the war.

John Paul Lederach’s *Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding*

John Paul Lederach incorporated Dugan’s model into his own nested time dimension for peace building. His timeframe model includes crisis intervention – preparation and training – design of social change – and desired future.²⁵ During crisis intervention, and at the issue level we have crisis management. These are the immediate-action drills required to stop the fighting or other violence when shaping and deterrence operations fail or an unidentified latent structural conflict manifests itself by violence in the open. Sometimes dealing with the specific issue is enough to stop the violence but this is akin to dealing with superficial wounds.

It is important to look for the root causes of the crisis and these causes might be found in any level of Dugan's nested model.²⁶ It is then important to have a vision for what the future looks like. Translated to military terms this is the commander's envisioned end-state. The major difference for this end-state compared with the end-state of military operations is that this vision must incorporate changes to the social structure and relationships within that structure. It is best if that vision includes measures to address any latent structural violence because issues not dealt with will most likely manifest themselves in attitudes and behaviors at a later date. Once this vision is articulated then it is up to the designated commander, his staff, and any agencies that might be around to work toward the desired change and ultimately find ways to prevent future crisis.

One of this model's strength is the fact that it reminds commanders and planners that conflict transformation and peace building often take extended periods of time to take effect. There might be quick fixes to superficial problems but sustained engagement is required to make lasting changes. This presents military professionals with two distinct dilemmas.

The first dilemma is that progress toward transformation can be slow, but the military tends to work fast and is always looking for an exit strategy. This is understandable because long deployments generally have a negative impact on morale, training, and recruitment. A solution to this dilemma is to create a separate branch or career path within the military that specializes in the military's role in conflict transformation and to stop focusing on exit strategies. The military must rid itself of the continual need to finish the job quick and move on to the next crisis.

The second dilemma for the military is that for transformation to be successful it requires a common coherent vision from a current commander for the future that subsequent commanders

must share and follow and strive for as long as it is still relevant. This is not something that is generally practiced in U.S. military cultural. In other words, the military itself must adjust its structures and culture to deal with the increased emphasis on stability and reconstruction. A possible solution for this dilemma is to leave high-level commanders, the ones that create strategic visions, in their billets much longer. There is a danger in this only if the commander's vision is mistaken but this problem can be solved by civilian oversight.

Watkins and Mohr's: *Appreciative Inquiry Theory*

Appreciative inquiry (AI) is a model for transforming an organization or society. It is different from problem solving because it focuses on what is right and good as opposed to searching for a problem and its solution. Focusing on "the best of what is"²⁷ or what works well could be likened to conducting an after action brief or hot-wash and only focusing on what went right, but this is a misunderstanding of the process. AI is not a conflict resolution theory; it is a model for problem solving. AI is most applicable to the military for internal improvement and would be best taught as a method for improving how units or groups operate. One specific place where AI would be beneficial is when units plan to plan. The process has five core principles and five generic processes.

The first core principle for changing any organization or in this case legitimate military audience is the *constructionist principle*. This requires the person studying the organization to view organizations as "living, human constructions."²⁸ One must discover how an organization or society thinks because this will influence the vision for the future directly. The second core principle is *simultaneity*. Inquiry, learning, and change all happen at the same time which means simply asking questions or attempting to discover how an organization works will produce changes in that organization.

The *anticipatory* principle “says that the most important resources we have for generating constructive organization change or improvement are our collective imagination and our discourses about the future.”²⁹ The people best suited to change a society are the members themselves. People create their own vision of the future and what would be ideal. Tapping into this vision is extremely important for creating a new future. This simple concept couples closely with the last two principles, the poetic principle and the positive principles.

The *poetic principle* holds that people are open to interpretation and re-interpretation just as a great poem. “The organization’s past, present, and future are endless sources of learning, inspiration, or interpretation, just as a good poem is open to endless interpretations.”³⁰ The term poetic might not be the term used to describe a military organization but there is no question that a good military organization is continually learning from its past and reinterpreting what happened in an effort to make things better. As Watkins says, “we can study moments of creativity and innovation or moments of debilitating stress.”³¹ The tendency in the military is to focus on what went wrong at the cost of capturing what went right. The military conducts excellent after actions reviews but the frame of reference is generally negative. The point is that it might be beneficial to alter the focus at times and explore more fully what is working well.

The *positive principle* says that one should focus on the positive aspect of a society then there is a much higher chance that positive transformation will take place. Being positive about the situation will help to identify fleeting windows of opportunity. The opposite of this is only focusing on the problems or what is wrong and that means the solutions or transformation will be negative. This relates back to the earlier discussion about positive and negative peace. Lack of fighting because of coercive force is negative and a fleeting peace at best.

The real strength of appreciative inquiry is that focusing on the positive aspects of a society or organization generally makes one more amiable to changes. Basic human psychology shows that negative comments, focusing on problems, cause defensive reactions and will often entrench a person in a position. The opposite is that praising or focusing on the good generally engenders trust, confidence and good will. This can then be used to build relationships that are necessary to initiate the desired changes. Of course this approach to change is not appropriate in all situations but the same can be said of the more problem-focused approach to change.

The conflict resolution theories and models presented in this section are by no means exhaustive of current literature, studies, and emerging theories that will help one deal with his/her environment and unique conflict. The point behind each brief explanation was to offer the reader exposure to relevant theories that should be integrated into professional military education and training. The next question to be answered is when, where, and how to introduce these theories.

Section III: Implementation

Successful integration of conflict analysis and resolution theories will require only minor modifications to the established training and military education systems because many of the education institutions are already expanding their curriculum to include what were previously considered non-standard subjects. Currently much of this training and education falls loosely under the rubric of cultural studies or irregular warfare. Conflict resolution is very much a multi-discipline social science so integrating anthropology, psychology, legal considerations, human rights, and peace studies with the current curriculums at the various professional education schools does not require a radical course change. It appears that there is a gradual shift among the professional military establishment toward integrating new methods for framing problems

and designing solutions. Perhaps the biggest challenge is to sell senior leaders that it is important to study peace and conflict resolution more actively than in the past.

It is recommended that entry-level officer training and education be expanded to include multi-disciplined approaches to conflict analysis and resolution. Entry-level training should consist of tactical decision games that illustrate conflict scenarios where members must identify underlying causes to the conflict and then generate ideas for mitigating the causes. Role-playing around sand tables and during tactical field problems should emphasize different types of conflict and show possible consequences for decisions made and actions taken. Officers should also be required to conduct detailed conflict analysis of a current conflict and brief their peers. Tactical level education should focus on *Needs Theory*, *Relative Deprivation*, and the *Nested Theory of Conflict* because these theories present readily identifiable aspects of the conflict that can be addressed at the lieutenant and captain levels.

The changes with the initial training must coincide with training at the career courses, intermediate-level course, and top-level schools. In short, the existing structure is already in place for officer education and should be used to integrate more of the humanities and social sciences into military education. The course of instruction should consist of relatively small seminars to facilitate discussion. Just as with entry level training, role-playing or decision-making exercises where participants examine a conflict to see if they can identify root causes or issues in terms of different theories should be incorporated. Essential to the role-playing or the decision-making exercises is deciding what action to take or how to intervene in the conflict. Discussing the intervention and exploring how the action taken might affect other aspects of the conflict is a key part of the exercise. *Appreciative Inquiry* should be introduced as a tool for planning team integration and course of action development. Galtung's theories on *structural*

and *cultural violence* should be integrated into seminars dealing with campaign development and operational design. Lederach's *Integrated Theory for Peacebuilding* is more strategic in nature because of the extended timelines so it should be introduced during problem framing and the planning process.

A larger concern is integrating conflict resolution theories into the enlisted education system. The approach for the enlisted side of the military should be similar to the officer education with the small exception that concerted efforts for education should focus mostly on the non-commissioned officer ranks. The reason for this is that for the most part, decision-making and problem solving processes begin to be taught once an enlisted member enters a supervisory position. This does not mean that education should wait until second term enlistments but it does mean that the member must be allowed to focus all his/her efforts to become proficient at the primary military occupational specialty. Once members show an aptitude for more complex problem solving, generally indicated by the potential to become an NCO, then they can broaden their horizons further. This will work well with the current enlisted professional military education system. Corporal's courses, Sergeant's courses, and Staff Non-commissioned Officer academies will benefit from introducing conflict resolution theories because this will produce NCOs who have a deeper understanding of conflict and how their actions can perpetuate conflict or can help resolve conflict. Generally speaking, the NCOs are closest to the general population during operations and giving them the tools to better analyze their surroundings will help produce innovative solutions. If the NCOs and officers understand the same concepts and are speaking the same language then there is more chance that the solutions to problems, conflicts, will not be coercion or violence as appropriate.

The overall point is that these theories, or at least the concepts behind the theories, must be introduced across the military services so that leaders across the spectrum are familiar with different types of conflicts and the many different models that help work toward resolution. Equally important is the understanding that these are not theories that only need be applied at the highest levels because military members are all faced with conflict and are required to act within their own sphere. It will be beneficial for all members of the military to better understand how and why conflict happens.

Conclusion

This study began by exploring recent changes in military doctrine concerning the military's role in fulfilling its charge to support strategic goals. There is a new emphasis on reconstruction and stability operations. The research found that planning for and conducting these types of operations require a different focus for military forces and coercive force might not always be the best answer for the conflict. The research demonstrates that there are alternative theories and models for dealing with conflict. The insight this provides the military community is that there are many tools that can be used to decipher complicated social conflicts; more tools than what show up in the traditional professional military education system. Conflict is an inherently social exercise. When humans find themselves in conflict there are myriad approaches to understand the conflict and create a new future. The theories are not formulas for success but they are important for understanding underlying causes of conflict.

Some of the key lessons learned from this research are that coercion is not the only method to change behavior. Lack of fighting is not peace. If one learns the right questions to ask then one can discover latent conflict and frustrations that might lead to violence if not

addressed. Violence engenders violence. Finally, the military has been ordered to place increased emphasis on missions it has traditionally performed as a second thought.

Endnotes:

¹ U.S. Department of Defense. *Stability Operations*. Instruction 3000.05, September 16, 2009

² U.S. Department of the Army, and Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. *Counterinsurgency*. FM 3-14 or MCWP 3-33.5. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 2006).

³ Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, MCWP 5-1 *Marine Corps Planning Process Functional Working Draft*. (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, August 2009).

⁴ This working definition comes from Wallace Warfield and Susan Allen Nan at George Mason University's Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

⁵ Gurr, Ted Robert Gurr. *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 46.

⁶ Gurr, 46.

⁷ Gurr, 50.

⁸ Gurr, 52.

⁹ Burton, 35

¹⁰ John W. Burton *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and their Prevention*. (Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press, 1997), 32.

¹¹ Burton, 37

¹² Galtung, 43

¹³ Galtung, 39

¹⁴ Galtung, 39

¹⁵ Galtung, 43. This quotation appears slightly confusing because in the original text Galtung uses quotes around terms like governability, trouble, and anarchy as a means to emphasize the words. It would be easier to understand the quote if these terms, the ones with single quotation marks, were underlined or italicized but that is not the way Galtung wrote the phrases. He is not quoting anyone but setting these words apart because their meaning is open to interpretation. The point behind the quotation is that the people in power prefer to stay in power and when a victim in that situation begins to lash out against the oppressor then that person is labeled a troublemaker. The revolutionary character becomes the aggressor and the threat to the social order.

¹⁶ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. 2nd edition. (Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK: Polity Press, 2006), 10.


¹⁷ Ramsbotham, 10

¹⁸ Galtung, 43.

¹⁹ Ramsbotham, 10

²⁰ Ramsbotham, 11

²¹ Marie A. Dugan, "Nested Theory of Conflict." *Leadership Journal: Women in Leadership – Sharing the Vision* 1 (July 1996): 14.




²² Dugan, 15

²³ Dugan, 16

²⁴ Dugan, 15

²⁵ John Paul Lederach. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1977), 80.



²⁶ Lederach, 73-85

²⁷ Jane Magruder Watkins and Bernard J. Mohr. *Appreciative Inquiry: Change at the Speed of Imagination*. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer, 2001), 42.

²⁸ Watkins, 38

²⁹ Watkins, 38

³⁰ Watkins, 38.

³¹ Watkins, 38.

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